Regulatory Guidance on Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending by Pannell, H. Gary & Carothers, Robert L., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 3
2007
Regulatory Guidance on Concentrations in
Commercial Real Estate Lending
H. Gary Pannell
Robert L. Carothers Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
H. G. Pannell & Robert L. Carothers Jr., Regulatory Guidance on Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, 11 N.C. Banking
Inst. 33 (2007).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol11/iss1/3
REGULATORY GUIDANCE ON
CONCENTRATIONS IN COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE LENDING
H. GARY PANNELL*'
ROBERT L. CAROTHERS, JR.2
On January 13, 2006, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) (Agencies)
published for comment in the Federal Register proposed guidance
entitled "Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending,
Sound Risk Management Practices" (Guidance).3 Eleven months,
one congressional hearing, and over 5,700 comment letters later,
the Guidance was issued in final.4 This Article summarizes what
transpired during these eleven months, including the Agencies'
reasons for issuing the Guidance, the industry's concerns over the
content of the Guidance, and the transformation of the Guidance
from its initial form to its final form. The Article concludes with
* The authors acknowledge with appreciation the thoughtful and helpful comments
of Professor Lissa Broome, Publication Editor Kimberly J. Tacy, and Dr. Alan
Kingsley, a student at the University of Virginia School of Law.
1. Mr. Gary Pannell is a partner in the Atlanta, Georgia office of the law firm of
Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, L.L.C. He received his undergraduate degree
from Washington and Lee University and his law degree from the University of
Virginia School of Law. Mr. Pannell also earned his M.B.A. from Georgia State
University and is a graduate of the Stonier Graduate School of Banking. He
practices in the areas of federal bank regulation and corporate law.
2. Robert L. Carothers, Jr. is an associate in the Mobile, Alabama office of the
law firm of Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, L.L.C. He is a graduate of the
University of Alabama School of Law (2000) and the Stonier Graduate School of
Banking (2004). He practices in the firm's Banking and Financial Services Practice
Group.
3. See Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. 2302 (proposed Jan. 13, 2006).
4. See Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. 74,580 (Dec. 12, 2006) (OCC, Fed and FDIC
version); see also Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,294 (Dec. 14, 2006) (OTS version).
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some suggestions to facilitate compliance with the requirements
mandated by the Guidance.
I. REGULATORY CONCERNS RELATING TO COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE CONCENTRATIONS
The Agencies' stated purpose for issuing the Guidance was
to "address the increasing concentrations of commercial real estate
(CRE) loans at many institutions."5 The Agencies were concerned
that these concentrations might make banks "more vulnerable to
cyclical CRE markets.",6 The Agencies were also concerned, based
on results from recent examinations, that some banks were
growing their CRE portfolios at a rapid pace without having
prudent risk management practices in place. Another concern
was that some banks were entering new markets without first
conducting appropriate market analyses and "establishing
adequate control and reporting processes."8
The Agencies' view of the risk associated with CRE loans is
heavily influenced by the events that occurred in the late 1980s and
early 1990s in the CRE industry. As the agency commentary to
the proposed Guidance noted, "[i]n the past, weak CRE loan
underwriting and depressed CRE markets have contributed to
significant bank failures and instability in the banking system." 9
These concerns over the CRE industry on the surface appear
legitimate, but they do not take into account the evolution of
banking practices over the past fifteen years.
The FDIC publication, History of the Eighties - Lessons
For the Future, explains the role CRE lending played in the
5. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. at 2304.
6. Id. Also, recent data reflects that between June 2000 and June 2006 there
was a significant increase in the number of FDIC-supervised institutions whose ratio
of CRE loans to Total Capital exceeded 300%. Marianne Lester et al., Examiners
Report on Commercial Real Estate Underwriting Practices, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS
(Div. of Supervision and Consumer Protection of the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Wash.,
D.C.), Winter 2006, at 28 tbl.1 [hereinafter Examiners Report], available at http://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin6/siwinO6.pdf.
7. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. at 2304.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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problems the banking industry experienced in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.'0 Beginning in the early 1980s, banks began to
increase their exposure to CRE loans." Demand for CRE was
stimulated by a number of factors, including provisions contained
in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (the 1981 Act) 2 that
provided favorable tax treatment to CRE projects. 3 The 1981 Act
changed the depreciation rules for CRE and allowed for
accelerated depreciation, increasing the tax deductions associated
with CRE and increasing the after-tax return on a CRE
investment." In addition, around this same time, thrifts were given
expanded authority to make CRE loans. 5  This increased
competition from thrifts led many banks to lower their
underwriting standards for CRE loans, which in turn helped fuel
the overbuilding cycle of the 1980s. 6
The enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had a
negative effect on the demand for CRE by eliminating (1) the
provision of the 1981 Act that allowed for accelerated depreciation
for CRE, and (2) the provision of the Internal Revenue Code that
allowed taxpayers to offset ordinary income with passive losses. 7
This decreased demand had the effect of softening real estate
prices.' 8
The decline in demand and the overbuilding that occurred
during the 1980s led to an unprecedented increase in vacancy rates
for office properties in major markets from 4.9% in 1980 to a peak
of 18.9% in 1991." Similarly, vacancy rates for retail properties
rose from 4.9% in 1983 to 10.8% in 1991.20
10. See 1 Div. OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY
OF THE EIGHTIES - LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 138 (1997) [hereinafter HISTORY OF
THE 80s], available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/voll.html.
11. Id. at 137.
12. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
13. HISTORY OF THE 80S, supra note 10, at 140-41.
14. Id.; see also Economic Recovery Tax Act, 95 Stat. 172.
15. See HISTORY OF THE 80S, supra note 10, at 154.
16. Id. at 153-56.
17. Id. at 140-41; see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat.
2085.
18. HISTORY OF THE 80S, supra note 10, at 141.
19. Id. at 146.
20. Id. at 148.
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Beginning in the late 1980s and persisting into the early
1990s, the CRE market went from a boom cycle to a bust cycle.21
The effect on the banking industry was severe. In 1991, the
proportion of nonperforming CRE loans to total CRE loans was
8.2%, and the proportion of charge-offs on CRE loans to total
CRE loans was 2.0% .22 Compounding the problem was the decline
in the value of the collateral that secured most CRE loans.
Appraisal standards during the 1980s were non-existent, resulting
in overinflated and sometimes fraudulent appraisals.23 In addition,
many banks had relaxed their underwriting standards, including
raising their maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios.24 Thus, when a
loan defaulted, the collateral securing the loan was not valuable
enough to repay the loan in full, leaving the lending bank with a
loss.
25
Evidence suggests that concentrations in CRE loans
contributed to many bank failures. Indeed, "in all years between
1980 and 1993, the concentrations of CRE loans relative to total
assets were higher for banks that subsequently failed than for
nonfailed banks., 26 In 1980, CRE loans of subsequently failed
banks represented approximately 6% of total assets, while in 1993,
this figure rose to almost 30%.27 Among nonfailed banks, CRE
loans also represented approximately 6% of total assets in 1980,
but the figure increased to only 11% in 1993.28
Based on the evidence from the 1980s and early 1990s, the
Agencies' concerns over increased CRE concentrations appear to
have a solid foundation. Many high-level officials within the
Agencies lived through the boom-bust cycle of this period and, as
they watched CRE concentrations increase, did not want to see
history repeat itself. However, these concerns do not take into
account a number of factors including:
21. Id.
22. Id. at 153 tbl.3.3.
23. Id. at 156-57.
24. HiSTORY OF THE 80S, supra note 10, at 155.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 158-59.
27. Id. at 159.
28. Id.
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* the development of syndicated lending practices which
diffuse credit risk over a large number of bank and
nonbank providers of capital;29
" the availability of better information on the health of CRE
markets resulting from the development of the Commercial
Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) market and Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) market;
* the demand for housing, office space, shopping centers, and
warehouses for the more than 100 million increase in
population in the Sunbelt and Pacific states over the past
two decades;
* the large amount of foreign investment in real estate
experienced over the past decade, particularly in South
Florida, California, Washington and New York City; and
* the development of much more stringent appraisal
standards that are diligently enforced by the regulatory
agencies.
II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE GUIDANCE IN ITS INITIAL FORM
The Guidance, as originally proposed, defined CRE loans
as:
exposures secured by raw land, land development
and construction (including 1-4 family residential
construction), multi-family property, and non-farm
nonresidential property where the primary or a
significant source of repayment is derived from
rental income associated with the property (that is,
loans for which 50[%] or more of the source of
repayment comes from third party, non-affiliated,
rental income) or the proceeds of the sale,
refinancing, or permanent financing of the
30property.
29. This is particularly true for large real estate investment and real estate
construction projects, typically in excess of $50 million.
30. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2304 (proposed Jan. 13, 2006).
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Loans to REITs and unsecured loans to developers that are
subject to the risks inherent in the CRE market were also included
in the definition of a CRE loan. 3' The proposed Guidance
expressly excluded loans secured by owner-occupied properties
from the definition of CRE, explaining that "their risk profiles are
less influenced by the condition of the general CRE market.
3 2
The proposed Guidance provided for two supervisory
thresholds. A bank that exceeded either threshold would be
deemed to have a concentration in CRE and would be required to
have heightened risk management practices consistent with the
standards set forth in the proposed Guidance.33 A bank crossed
the first threshold when its total loans for construction and land
development were equal to or exceeded its total risk-based
capital.34 A bank crossed the second threshold when its total loans
for construction and land development, multifamily, and non-farm
nonresidential real estate were equal to or exceeded 300% of its
total risk-based capital.35
The proposed Guidance also set forth a number of risk
management principles that a bank with a CRE concentration
would be expected to follow. The principles set forth in the
proposed Guidance were intended to reinforce already existing
36
supervisory expectations for a "safe and sound" lending program.
The risk management principles are described below:
Board and Management Oversight: A bank's board of
directors should approve its overall CRE lending strategy
and policies. 37 The board should receive reports on changes
in CRE market conditions and the bank's CRE lending
activity; the reports should identify the size, significance,
and risks related to the bank's CRE concentration. 3 "The
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2305.
34. Id. This threshold will hereinafter be referred to as the "100% threshold."
35. Id.
36. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. at 2305.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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board should periodically review and approve CRE
aggregate risk exposure limits and appropriate sublimits
(for example, by property type and geographic area) . '. . ."'
Further, "management is responsible for implementing the
CRE strategy in a manner that is consistent with the bank's
stated risk tolerance," as well as developing and
implementing policies and procedures for identifying,
measuring, and monitoring CRE risks. °
Strategic Planning: A bank should address its CRE
concentration as part of its strategic planning process and
"perform an analysis of the potential effect of a downturn
in real estate markets on both earnings and capital., 41
Further, its strategy should include a contingency plan that
responds to adverse market conditions and addresses
possible ways to mitigate CRE concentration risk, such as
selling CRE loans on the secondary market.42 If selling
loans on the secondary market is part of the contingency
plan, then a bank should assess the marketability of its
portfolio, including comparing its underwriting standards
with those of the secondary market.
Underwriting: A bank should have lending policies that
clearly define the risk tolerance acceptable to the bank and
provide measurable underwriting standards consistent with
agency guidance.43 Loan policies should address standards
for, among other things, LTV limits by property type and
minimum requirements for borrower equity.44 Also, for
development and construction loans, a bank "should have
sound policies and procedures governing loan
disbursements., 45 Moreover, "management should compare
[its] underwriting standards ... with those that exist in the
secondary market," and should justify reasons for deviation
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. at 2305.
43. Id. at 2305.
44. Id. at 2305-06.
45. Id. at 2306.
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if it finds that its standards are "substantially more
lenient., 46 Finally, a bank should permit exceptions to its
underwriting standards only on a limited basis and should
document any exceptions, obtain appropriate approvals,
and report them to the Board of Directors.47
" Risk Assessment and Monitoring of CRE Loans: A bank
"should establish and maintain thoroughly articulated
policies" and procedures for risk rating its CRE exposures,
monitoring its CRE loans, and identifying loan
impairment.48
* Portfolio Risk Management: A bank "should measure and
control CRE credit risk on a portfolio basis, [and not just
on an individual loan basis], by identifying and managing
[loan] concentrations ....
* Management Information Systems: A bank's management
information system (MIS) "should provide meaningful
information on CRE portfolio characteristics that are
relevant to the [bank's] lending strategy, underwriting
standards, and risk tolerances."50  Banks should stratify
their CRE portfolio by such categories as property type
and geographic area.51
* Identifying and Managing Concentrations: "Management
should continually evaluate the degree of potential
correlation between related sectors and establish internal
lending guidelines and limits that control the [bank's]
overall risk exposure. 52 Management should also develop
strategies for managing concentration levels, such as the
use of secondary market sales, in order to reduce
concentrations in certain property types or geographic
53
areas.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. at 2306.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id.
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* Market Analysis: A bank should perform ongoing
evaluations of market conditions and integrate its findings
into its CRE lending strategy.54  Market analysis is
particularly important when expanding into new markets.
Further, a bank should "utilize multiple sources for
obtaining market information such as published research
data, monitoring new building permits, and maintaining
contacts with local contractors, builders, real estate agents,
and community development groups."55
" Portfolio Stress Testing: Banks are encouraged to utilize
portfolio stress testing, understanding that this is an
"evolving process. 5 6 The level of sophistication of the
stress portfolio model need only "be consistent with the
size and complexity of the [bank's] CRE portfolio."57
In addition to the requirement of heightened risk
management practices, the proposed Guidance also stated that "an
institution with a CRE concentration should recognize the need
for additional capital support for CRE concentrations in its
strategic, financial, and capital planning, including an assessment
of the potential for future losses on CRE exposures. 5 8 It further
stated that "[i]n assessing the adequacy of an institution's capital,
the Agencies [would] take into account . . .an evaluation of the
level of inherent risk in the CRE portfolio and the quality of [the
institution's] risk management" practices.59  The proposed
Guidance concludes by stating that "an institution that is unable to
adequately assess and meet its capital needs may be required to
develop a plan for reducing its concentrations or for achieving
higher capital ratios. ' 6°
54. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. at 2307.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. at 2307.
60. Id.
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III. INDUSTRY'S RESPONSE TO THE GUIDANCE
The significance of the Guidance is illustrated by the
industry's interest in it. Out of approximately 9,000 depository
institutions in the United States, the Agencies collectively received
61
over 5,700 comment letters on the proposed Guidance. 61 In fact,
the Agencies decided to extend the public comment period on the
Guidance for an additional thirty days due to the "wide public
interest in the proposal., 62 The interest generated was influenced
by the universe of banks potentially impacted by the Guidance.
Early industry estimates indicated that nearly a third of all banks
would exceed at least one of the two numerical thresholds,
although these estimates did not account for the mitigating effect
of owner-occupied loans.63
The majority of the comment letters were from financial
institutions and their trade associations. The vast majority of
commenters expressed strong opposition to the proposed
Guidance. For purposes of this Article, we have chosen to
highlight the views found in the comment letters of two industry
trade associations, the American Bankers Association (ABA) and
the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA), as well
as a comment letter submitted by the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors (CSBS). These comment letters are representative of
the views of the banking industry as a whole.
Prior to analyzing the comment letters, it is important to
understand how the financial markets have changed over the past
two decades. Community banks have, in large part, been
eliminated from large segments of the consumer lending market.
Automobile financing has become highly concentrated in the
automobile companies' captive finance companies and credit
61. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. 74,580, 74,581 (Dec. 12, 2006) (OCC, Fed. and
FDIC version); Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,294, 75,295 (Dec. 14, 2006) (OTS version).
62. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, Extension of Comment Period, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,215, 13,216-
17 (Mar. 14, 2006).
63. Ben Jackson, Small Banks' Dim View of CRE Proposal, AM. BANKER, Mar.
3, 2006, § Community Banking, at 1.
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unions. The credit card market has been highly concentrated with
ten banks controlling over 80% of the receivables, and a major
portion of the residential mortgage market has been captured by
nonbank providers. Technological advances coupled with
securitization have facilitated this evolution. As a consequence,
smaller commercial banks have been finding that their major
lending markets reside in the small business and commercial real
estate areas.
A. CSBS Comment Letter
Not all of the bank regulatory agencies thought it necessary
to issue the Guidance. CSBS is the association that represents the
interests of the various state banking supervisory authorities.
CSBS made it very clear in its comment letter that it believes the
Guidance is unwarranted based on the health of today's CRE
market, and based on its view that supervisory tools are already
available to regulators to allow them to deal effectively with
unsafe and unsound CRE lending practices.6 CSBS stated that
recent joint examinations with the federal regulatory agencies
indicated that most banks were prudently managing their CRES 61
concentrations. It expressed the view that awareness over the
potential risks associated with a CRE concentration is prudent, but
that the proposed Guidance went too far and was too
prescriptive.66
Several concerns about the form of the Guidance were
expressed by CSBS. One concern was that "[t]he proposed
Guidance [did] not recognize that risk varies among CRE sub-
markets., 67 Another concern was that the Guidance would place a
heavy burden on community banks, which could result in smaller
banks diverting their resources away from CRE lending, an area in
64. Letter from Neil Milner, President and CEO, Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, to Robert E. Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp, Jennifer
J. Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision 3 (Mar. 24, 2006),
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2006/O6c549crelending.pdf.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1.
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which they have great expertise, and into other areas in which they
do not have expertise.68 For example, CSBS was concerned that
certain requirements, such as requiring a bank to perform stress
testing and other similar types of analysis, would impose
significant expense on smaller banks while creating little value for
the bank.69 In the view of CSBS, the proposed Guidance failed to
recognize "the greatest risk mitigation tool available to community
banks - the proximity of the lender to the borrower."70
B. ABA and ICBA Comment Letters
One of the primary concerns of the banking industry was
the fear that the 100% and 300% thresholds would turn into hard
caps on the amount of CRE loans a bank could hold in its portfolio
when implemented by the Agencies' examiners. This concern is
based on the theory that there is a tendency on the part of
examiners to err on the side of caution and, as a result, the burden
of proof placed on banks by examiners to justify their CRE
concentration would be so great that it could never be met. The
ABA, in its comment letter, stated that "of gravest concern to our
bankers is the belief that the guidance may be interpreted as a
direction to examiners, once a CRE concentration in the bank's
portfolio of loans is found, to require a bank to take additional
steps (perhaps including adding capital or refraining from making
additional CRE loans), even if that portfolio is well managed." 71
The ABA and ICBA also expressed concern over the
manner in which CRE was defined for purposes of the Guidance.
For example, the ABA noted that the definition in the proposed
Guidance "melds various loans secured by [CRE] into essentially
one risk bucket" and ignores "the very different risk profiles" of
68. Id. at 1-2.
69. Id. at 2.
70. Letter from Neil Milner to Robert E. Feldman, Jennifer J. Johnson, Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, supra note 64, at
2.
71. Letter from Mark Tenhundfeld, Director, Office of Regulatory Policy, Am.
Bankers Ass'n., to Susan Schmidt Bies, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. 1 (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2006/August/
20060808/OP-1248/OP-1248_1698_1.pdf.
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the various types of CRE-secured loans. It pointed out that there
is no differentiation in the proposed Guidance between loans
secured by office and retail properties (which carry more risk) and
construction loans on one-to-four family homes.73  Further, it
pointed out that "there is no differentiation between 1-4 family
residential construction that is built 'on speculation' from a 1-4
family residential construction where the contractor already has a
contract for the house. 7 4 The ABA's concern was that by lumping
in low-risk residential home construction loans with traditionally
higher-risk CRE loans, a bank's CRE loan totals might inflate and
subject a bank to unwarranted supervisory scrutiny.75
The industry also held the view that the Guidance was
unnecessary and that its "one-size-fits-all approach" would have a
negative impact on banks that are prudently managing their CRE
portfolio by increasing their burden and expense while not offering
76
any additional benefits. For example, the ABA recommended in
its comment letter that "instead of imposing these new costs on the
industry in general, the Agencies [should] apply existing guidance
on a case-by-case basis to address any problems in those banks not
engaging in CRE lending responsibly."77 The ABA further stated
that it "believe[s] that the application of the Guidance to all banks
is excessive and that the full array of measures it requires should
be reserved for those few banks that have problems in the risk
management of their portfolios .... The ICBA comment letter
echoed this concern in stating that "[c]ommunity banks question
the need for this new guidance; they believe that the existing body
of real estate lending standards, regulations and guidelines is
72. Letter from Paul Smith, Senior Counsel, Am. Bankers Ass'n, to Robert E.
Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp, Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
Office of Thrift Supervision 3 (Mar. 30, 2006), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
laws/federal/2006/06c6l9crelending.pdf.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 3-4.
75. See id. at 2.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Letter from Paul Smith to Robert E. Feldman, Jennifer J. Johnson, Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, supra note 72, at
6.
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sufficient to guide banks through any weakness in the CRE
market., 79 The ICBA further stated that "[e]xaminers already
have the necessary tools to enforce rules and regulations and
address unsafe and unsound practices; thus community banks view
the new guidance as unnecessary. '" 80
Along these same lines, there was concern that an examiner
might interpret the Guidance as requiring a bank to adopt all of
the risk management measures referenced in the Guidance,
regardless of the size and complexity of the bank's CRE portfolio.
The ABA noted that "[t]here appears to be no attempt in the
proposed Guidance to scale the regulatory response to the size of
the bank or the particular composition of its portfolio."'" There
was also concern that the risk management requirements set forth
in the proposed Guidance "may be overwhelming to a community
bank" and will place an excessive and unnecessary burden on
community banks.82 The ICBA comment letter noted that "the
proposal's recommendations regarding MIS enhancements and
stress testing [will be] particularly costly and burdensome to
community banks; the costs will most likely out weigh the benefits
for smaller banks, with the result being an unwarranted and
unnecessary contraction in CRE lending., 83 The ICBA further
noted that community banks "typically operate in a limited
geographic area" and this enables them to "closely monitor the
economic status" of their borrowers and their local community,
thus decreasing their need for complex stress testing and MIS
systems.84 It argued that examiners should look at the particular
79. Letter from Karen M. Thomas, Executive Vice President, Indep. Cmty.
Bankers of Am., to Robert E. Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp,
Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision 2 (Apr. 12, 2006),
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2006/O6c789crelending.pdf.
80. Id.
81. Letter from Paul Smith to Robert E. Feldman, Jennifer J. Johnson, Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, supra note 72, at 6
82. Id. at 6-7.
83. Letter from Karen M. Thomas to Robert E. Feldman, Jennifer J. Johnson,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, supra
note 79, at 7.
84. Id. at 7-8.
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needs of each institution during the examination process and
encourage enhancements to these systems as needed.85
Both the ABA and ICBA also expressed concern that
language contained in the proposed Guidance regarding capital
could lead examiners to arbitrarily demand higher capital for any
bank with a concentration, regardless of the actual risk contained
in the CRE portfolio.86 They urged the Agencies to eliminate the
discussion on the need for additional capital if a concentration is
present and rely instead on existing authority as the basis for a
case-by-case determination of any need for additional capital.87
The ABA and ICBA were also concerned about the impact
the proposed Guidance would have on small community banks
and their communities. The ABA noted that community banks
are finding it hard to compete in various types of consumer lending
businesses, such as credit card lending, auto lending, and
residential mortgage lending.88  One area in which small
community banks have been able to remain competitive is CRE
lending. Their knowledge of their communities and markets
provides them with a considerable advantage when competing
against larger banks for CRE loans.89  Their "willingness to
support business expansion in their communities has been crucial
to economic recovery over the last few years." 90
The industry also took issue with the Agencies' premise for
issuing the Guidance. As mentioned above, the Agencies made it
clear that their concern over CRE concentrations stems from the
bust cycle that occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s. As
summarized in the ABA comment letter, the industry believes that
85. Id. at 8.
86. Id. at 4, 8; Letter from Paul Smith to Robert E. Feldman, Jennifer J. Johnson,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, supra
note 72, at 7-9.
87. Letter from Karen M. Thomas to Robert E. Feldman, Jennifer J. Johnson,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, supra
note 79, at 8; Letter from Paul Smith to Robert E. Feldman, Jennifer J. Johnson,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, supra
note 72, at 9.
88. Letter from Paul Smith to Robert E. Feldman, Jennifer J. Johnson, Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, supra note 72, at
9-10.
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id.
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"banking today is different from what it was in the mid-eighties.
We now have new capital requirements, more stringent real estate
lending and appraisal requirements, express limits on high LTV
real estate loans, and better supervisory examinations. '" 91  In
addition, it was pointed out that better information on the
condition of the CRE market is available today due to the growth
of REITs and the creation of the CMBS market.9 This
information was virtually nonexistent during the 1980s and early
1990s.
C. Other Concerns
An additional concern for counsel for financial institutions
is the types of enforcement actions the Agencies could employ to
require adherence to the regulatory thresholds. The Agencies
followed traditional administrative law standards which underpin
agency enforcement powers in issuing the Guidance. The
Guidance was issued initially with Notice of Comment provisions
in January 2006. By utilizing this administrative process the
Agencies may well have produced a de facto regulation at the time
the Guidance was issued in final form. In the event the Agencies
wish to enforce the Guidance through provisions of the Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act (cease and desist powers) or the
Financial Institutions Regulatory Act (civil money penalty
powers), a reviewing court may be compelled to uphold the agency
authority pursuant to the Chevron Doctrine93 as it is incorporated
in the Supreme Court decisions in U.S.N.B. v. IIAA, 508 U.S. 439
(1993), NationsBank v. VALIC, 513 U.S. 251 (1995), Barnett Bank
v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996), and Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735
(1996).
91. Id. at 9.
92. Review of Proposed Financial Services Regulations: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on
Financial Service, 110th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony by Glenn R.
Mueller, Ph.D Professor, University of Denver).
93. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(holding that reviewing courts must follow any reasonable agency interpretation of
an "ambiguous" statute).
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On the one hand, the Agencies in their press releases
stressed the informal nature of the Guidance and the amount of
discretion which remains with the individual examiner, while on
the other hand, the Agencies have utilized a procedure for its
issuance which transforms the Guidance into a regulation. This
problem is addressed by the Office of Management and Budget's
Good Guidance Practice Bulletin issued on November 23, 2005, 9
which to-date has not been issued in final form. There is no effort
to harmonize the Guidance with the proposed Office of
Management and Budget issuance. However, a literal reading of
the proposed Office of Management and Budget issuance may
lead to the conclusion that the Guidance is a regulation.
D. Congressional Hearing
Based on the amount of public interest generated by the
proposed Guidance, the House Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit held a hearing on September 14,
2006.9' The hearing included a panel of regulators and industry
representatives and allowed each side to express their views on the
necessity and content of the Guidance. The panel of regulators
included representatives of the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC,
OTS, and CSBS. The panel of industry representatives included
representatives of the ABA, ICBA, America's Community
Bankers, and others.
Most of the testimony rehashed the views previously
discussed, with one major exception. During his testimony, OTS
Director John Reich expressed his view, for the first time publicly,
that he felt that the 100% and 300% thresholds should be
eliminated from the Guidance.96  His view concerning the
thresholds was a major sticking point with the other agencies.
Additionally, CSBS raised an issue at the hearing not found
in its comment letter. In its testimony, CSBS expressed concern
94. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET,
OMB RELEASES DRAFT BULLETIN FOR GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES, 2005-30
(2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2005/2005-30.pdf
95. See Hearing, supra note 92.
96. Id. (statement of John M. Reich, Director, Office of Thrift Supervision).
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that the thresholds could be interpreted by examiners in the field
as limits, and therefore effectively serve as a cap on an institution's
ability to exceed them, even if the portfolio is prudently
underwritten and well managed.97  As previously discussed, this
was also a chief concern of the banking industry.
The members of the Subcommittee attending the hearing
expressed major concern over the proposed Guidance, particularly
Ranking Member Barney Frank. Mr. Frank was concerned about
the message the Guidance would send to the industry and
examiners. He said, "[t]he very fact that you single something out
has a great impact., 98 He was particularly concerned about the
impact the Guidance would have on multifamily housing, noting
the outstanding track record of multifamily portfolios over the last
several years.99
IV. FINAL GUIDANCE
On December 6, 2006, the Guidance was issued in its final
form.1°° The final Guidance had some noticeable changes from its
initial form. Most notably, the OTS decided to issue its own
version of the Guidance without the numerical thresholds. In the
weeks leading up to the issuance of the final Guidance, OTS
Director Reich made it clear that he believed the Guidance should
not contain numerical thresholds. TM After the final Guidance was
issued, Director Reich explained his reasoning for not including
the numerical thresholds in the OTS version of the Guidance.
Echoing the sentiments of the banking industry, he stated that he
thought the Guidance was "too prescriptive, that the numbers
would be interpreted by bank examiners across the country as
97. Id. (statement of Steven L. Antonakes, Massachusetts Commissioner of
Banks, on behalf of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors).
98. Steven Sloan, Legislators Press Agencies On Basel, CRE Guidelines, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 15, 2006, § Washington, at 1-2.
99. Id.
100. See Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. 74,580 (Dec. 12, 2006) (OCC, Fed and FDIC
version); see also Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,294 (Dec. 14, 2006) (OTS version).
101. John M. Reich, Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, Remarks at Annual
Conference of America's Community Bankers (Oct. 15, 2006).
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ceilings, not screens or thresholds for further examination.' 1 2 He
further stated that he was "fearful as to how the guidance will be
administered."'0'3 Apart from the elimination of the numerical
thresholds, the OTS version of the Guidance is very similar in
most other respects to the version issued by the other three
banking agencies.
While the other three banking agencies did not eliminate
the numerical thresholds, they did add an additional screen for the
300% threshold. In addition to a bank's total CRE loans equaling
or exceeding 300% of its total risk-based capital, the bank's CRE
portfolio must also have increased by 50% or more over the prior
thirty-six months in order for the 300% threshold to become
applicable9cl The addition of the 50% screen was in response to
the industry's concern that the concentration thresholds did not
take into account an institution's experience in managing CRES 105
concentrations. This additional screen places more of a focus on
banks that have rapidly grown their CRE portfolio. It should be
noted that the 50% growth rate screen does not apply to the 100%
threshold.
The agencies also added language to reduce the likelihood
that examiners would view the numerical thresholds as limits. In
the second paragraph of the Guidance, the following sentence was
added: "The Guidance does not establish specific CRE lending
limits; rather, it promotes sound risk management practices and
appropriate levels of capital that will enable institutions to
continue to pursue CRE lending in a safe and sound manner."'
6
Additionally, in the section of the Guidance that outlines the two
numerical thresholds, a section was added stating:
The Agencies will use the criteria as a preliminary
step to identify institutions that may have CRE
concentration risk. Because regulatory reports
102. Barbara A. Rehm, OTS Sells Thrift Charter in Pursuit of Start-ups, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 15, 2006, § Washington, at 1.
103. Id.
104. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. at 74,587.
105. Id. at 74,584.
106. Id. at 74,585.
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capture a broad range of CRE loans with varying
risk characteristics, the supervisory monitoring
criteria do not constitute limits on an institution's
lending activity but rather serve as high-level
indicators to identify institutions potentially
exposed to CRE concentration risk.107
The Agencies'08 also took steps to address other concerns
raised by the industry during the comment period. Many
commenters were concerned over the broadness of the definition
of CRE for purposes of the Guidance and the lack of recognition
in the proposed Guidance of potential for diversification by
property type and geography. The Agencies responded by
noting that "because the Guidance does not impose lending limits,
its scope is purposely broad so that it includes those CRE loans,
including multifamily loans, with risk profiles sensitive to the
condition of the general CRE markets, such as market demand,
changes in capitalization rates, vacancy rates and rents.""0 The
final Guidance includes a section discussing certain factors that
will mitigate the risk associated with a CRE concentration,
including portfolio diversification, geographic dispersion,
underwriting standards, level of presold buildings, and portfolio
liquidity.' This provides bankers and examiners with more
guidance as to risk mitigation factors. Additionally, a sentence
was added which states that "the Agencies recognized that
different types of CRE lending present different levels of risk, and
that consideration should be given to the lower risk profiles and
historically superior performance of certain types of CRE, such as
well-structured multifamily housing finance, when compared to
others, such as speculative office space construction. 1 .
107. Id. at 74,587.
108. Because of the substantial similarity between the OTS's Final Guidance and
the other three banking agencies' Final Guidance, the remainder of this Article, for
purposes of simplicity, will reference only the latter, and "Agencies" will hereinafter
refer to the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, the FDIC, and the OCC.
109. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. at 74,582.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 74,587.
112. Id. at 74,585.
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Another concern raised by the industry during the
comment period was the expense associated with upgrading their
MIS systems and portfolio stress testing. The Agencies included
language in the final Guidance acknowledging that "[t]he
sophistication of [an institution's] MIS will necessarily vary with
the size and complexity of the CRE portfolio and level and nature
of concentration risk." ' Further, the final Guidance notes that
portfolio stress testing may not require the use of sophisticated
portfolio models, and the sophistication of stress testing practices
"should be consistent with the size, complexity and risk
characteristics of its CRE loan portfolio.,
114
The Agencies also took action to address the concern
raised during the comment period that an examiner might
interpret the Guidance as requiring a bank to adopt all of the risk
management measures referenced in the Guidance, regardless of
the size and complexity of the bank's CRE portfolio. The Agencies
included a sentence at the beginning of the Risk Management
section stating that "[t]he sophistication of an institution's CRE
risk management processes should be appropriate to the size of
the portfolio, as well as the level and nature of concentrations and
the associated risk to the institution."'
1 5
The final Guidance also clarified the circumstances under
which a bank should compare its underwriting standards to those
of the secondary market, and it included language acknowledging
that an institution's market analysis will vary based upon the
availability of market data.
1 16
V. POTENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNITY BANKS TO COPE
WITH THE NEW REGIME
It will be interesting to see what impact the Guidance has
on the CRE portfolios of banks. Will the numerical thresholds
simply serve as screens in order to focus examiners on institutions
113. Id. at 74,586.
114. Id. at 74,587.
115. Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. at 74,585.
116. Id. at 74,583.
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with concentrations, or will the thresholds turn into caps as many
bankers fear? Are there realistic strategies that banks can employ
to relieve regulatory concerns expressed by the Guidance?
Clearly, many community banks will be required to
upgrade their internal control and monitoring procedures to
provide greater detail on loan concentrations. The Guidance
specifies a number of control measures which appear to have been
developed by large banks in implementing BASEL II
requirements. These measures will require expenditures for both
software and staff.
It will be important for a bank to work closely with its
regulator in developing its strategy for managing its CRE
portfolio. Prior to spending money to upgrade its systems and
controls, a bank should develop a plan outlining any changes it
deems necessary and meet with its regulator to ensure that the
proposed steps are sufficient. The following actions appear to be
minimal steps required to meet the expectations of the regulators:
* A bank will need to develop a CRE Lending Strategy
Statement to be approved by its Board of Directors. At a
minimum, the statement should set forth: (i) the acceptable
level of risk within the bank's CRE portfolio; (ii)
acceptable levels of concentration for the various types of
CRE loans; and (iii) the responsibilities of bank
management for establishing procedures to identify,
measure, monitor and prepare reports for the Board on the
CRE portfolio and the risks contained therein. As part of
its CRE lending strategy, it will be prudent for banks to
include strategies for managing CRE concentrations once
they are identified. This could include taking such actions
as identifying loans within its portfolio that are eligible for
sale on the secondary market.
* The most important step that a bank will need to take is to
develop a complete understanding of the make-up of its
CRE portfolio. In order to accomplish this, a bank will
need to stratify its CRE portfolio. It will be the
responsibility of the Board of Directors and senior
management to determine the various categories for the
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stratification. It may be as simple as stratifying by CRE
loan type (office, retail, industrial, apartments, hotel) or the
categories may be broken down even further to include
specific types of properties within each category.
* The Board of Directors will need to establish appropriate
limits and sub-limits for each exposure type (for example, a
limit on loans made on retail shopping centers in a certain
geographic area). 7 Once these limits are established, the
Board should periodically receive reports comparing the
bank's CRE portfolio to the limits set forth in the bank's
loan policy.
* It will also be important for bank personnel to properly
code each CRE loan in order to ensure proper
identification for internal reporting purposes, and to ensure
that any owner-occupied loan is properly accounted for.
* A bank will need to develop minimal standards for CRE
loan applications and files and develop an exception report
tracking system for exceptions granted in the loan
applications. The Board of Directors should receive
reports on a periodic basis listing each exception to the
bank's CRE Loan Policy. Along with this list of exceptions
should be a thorough explanation as to why each exception
was granted (for example, what mitigating factors were
taken into consideration in approving the loan).
* The Board of Directors, as well as management, should
closely monitor the conditions of the various markets in
which the bank makes CRE loans. The type of information
analyzed will vary depending upon the bank's market. For
banks located in non-metropolitan areas, it may be difficult
to obtain research reports on the bank's market. However,
a bank in such a market should establish contacts with local
developers, builders and real estate agents to gain an
understanding of the direction the market is heading, and
then take any necessary action based upon this
information. For example, if the market analysis
117. See Examiner's Report, supra note 6, at 30.
118. See Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices; 71 Fed. Reg. at 74,586, see also Examiners Report, supra note
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indicates that vacancy rates for office properties are
increasing significantly, the bank should reevaluate its
strategy in making future loans to this market segment.
This may necessitate revising the bank's portfolio limits.
* A bank will need to closely examine its appraisal process to
ensure that it is compliant with industry standards. It will
be prudent for banks to establish strong internal appraisal
review programs that provide an independent analysis of
appraisals prior to funding. 9 A bank should also review
the qualifications of its appraisers on an ongoing basis and
remove those that do not provide appraisals that comply
with the relevant regulatory requirements for appraisals. 20
These are just some of the immediate steps a bank will
need to consider initiating. In dealing with the long term
implications of the Guidance, community banks may be compelled
to revise their strategic planning to develop alternative lines of
business or increase capital to accommodate the new regulatory
requirements.
Diversification of credit risk by (i) geographic region, (ii)
asset composition, (iii) CRE product type, and (iv) source of
repayment will be the mantra for long term compliance. Many
community banks may benefit from purchasing loan participations
from correspondent banks. There has been increased interest in
utilizing this alternative as a method to diversify the risk in a
bank's portfolio of loans.
The Board of Directors and senior management will play a
crucial role in determining the real impact that the Guidance has
on their bank. If the Board of Directors and senior management
are proactive in managing their bank's CRE portfolio and take the
steps necessary to understand and mitigate the risks within the
portfolio, their bank should be able to withstand any heightened
regulatory scrutiny resulting from the Guidance.
6, at 30.
119. See Examiners Report, supra note 6, at 31.
120. Id.
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